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China and International Relations
in the New Millennium
"If
profit disappears through
one outlet only, the state will have no
equal; if it disappears
through two outlets, the state will have only
half
the profit; but if the profit disappears through ten
outlets, the
state will not
be preserved. If the penalties are clear, there will be
great
control, but if
they are not
clear, there will
be the six
parasites." Shang
Yang "The Book of Lord Shang" fourth century B.C.
[Chaliand 1994: 244]
Any effort
to shake joss
sticks so as to ascertain the
future of China's international
relations in the new millennium (as defined by the Western Gregorian
calendar) should first look back
at the millennia of Chinese geohistory
from an aesthetic perspective.
Here,
the observant eye can catch general
trends in particular epochs that can be
adequately compared and
contrasted so as
to reveal significant similarities and differences
between those eras.
This methodological approach may
then provide the observer with an accounting of the dynamics of international interactions of the past
and how they evolved over a
specified period of
time. The dynamic
of the past interrelationships and
interactions may then be compared and contrasted with the
dynamics of the
present in order
to obtain a glimpse of alternative yet possible futures.
A millennial perspective attempts to
explain China's repeated attempts to
overcome periods of
"warring states" through repeated moves toward
unification resulting in a general
pattern of expansion followed by
subsequent collapse into warring states
then followed by either invasion
and/or renewed efforts
of unification, if not toward an even greater expansion,
culminating in the Qing empire.
It
is common, for example, to compare the interwar period
and the beginnings of the Chinese
revolution with the "warring states" of 475 BC to
221 BC unified under the Qin dynasty (221 BC to 207 BC), in which Mao
Ze Dong plays the role
of Qin Shin Huang, a comparison
Mao himself propagated. This analogy represents a clear example in
which the ancient and the irrational unexpectedly intrude upon the
so-called "modern" and "rational." Yet
it also represents
an analogy that quickly becomes clichéd, unless the
significant differences between past and present are thoroughly compared and contrasted.
As
it is impossible in a brief space to relate the rich textures of Chinese
history, the focus
of this short essay will be to compare
and contrast contemporary post-World War II
Chinese ambition to achieve greater
regional, if not
global, power and influence with
efforts of China under the ancien
regime to expand its interests overland and overseas
in the Ming (and then the Qing) dynasties from a demi-millennial perspective. The
article will accordingly
seek to bring
out key similarities and
differences between these
roughly comparable eras despite the considerable time span
between them.
International relations under the
Ming dynasty will
first be examined, as the latter took
steps toward becoming a maritime
trading state, becoming an amphibious naval power from
1405-1433 A.D. China then suddenly abandoned
its overseas ambitions and turned toward continental expansion
to the west and the
north under the Qing dynasty, with the significant exception
in which the
Qing dynasty reluctantly absorbed Taiwan as part of
their conflict with Ming loyalists. Secondly, the efforts
of the "new" China (which has borrowed more from its past
than generally recognized)
to expand its
power and influence will then be explored. It shall be argued that China is once again attempting to move
beyond essentially continental status and toward that of an
amphibious, if not triphibious, power. In this regard, China is developing
land, sea, and air capabilities (a blue
water navy, plus intercontinental ballistic
missiles and satellite
communications) for the
purposes of exerting regional, if not overseas, hegemony.
Another fundamental
difference should be
underscored: China under the Ming largely
acted outside the European
systemic framework and the largely
European-dominated "World History". Post-World War II China
has, however, increasingly entered
World History on its own footing in a
new systemic geohistorical and geoeconomic
context that is
no longer dominated by the
European powers. In effect, the "new" China has not only entered into
a transitional period involving
domestic change, but more accurately,
it is entering a transformative
epoch in World History that could substantially alter not only the regional, but also the global, equilibrium.
It
shall moreover be argued that the Chinese version of
"communism" has not significantly reformed
itself beyond its pre-1911
imperial past. Contemporary China still appears
to be bound by geohistorical limitations in terms
of its potential territorial
expansion as well as to the maximum possible extent of its
regional and overseas influence.
Moreover, in terms of domestic governance
and foreign policy decision-making, Chinese Communism has not yet
proved itself to
be more flexible than the system of prebendalism
that predominated
throughout the ancient
regime. Contrary to
its ideology, [i] « communist
prebendalism » differs more in form than in substance in regard to its
imperial Confucian past.[ii]
The
key issue raised
above is that China's "vaulting ambition" may "overleap its bounds," to paraphrase Shakespeare. On the one hand,
China could overexpand its continental
and overseas influence (through
the absorption of
Taiwan, for example, or by
providing greater support for
North Korea). Such
actions, however, could
lead to overextension or implosion - if not confrontation with the
United States and Japan.
Or,
on the other hand, China
could accept its present external
geopolitical status as a "self-satisfied" state (having now
acquired both Hong Kong
and Macao). Beijing
could then look inwardly to critically
examine and address
the numerous domestic and international issues and crises
that will continue to confront it in the near future.
Rather than exacerbate tensions, China could seek compromise over Taiwan and
Tibet, for example, and seek
to quell tensions on the Korean peninsula, in addition
to addressing issues
of growing domestic concern involving political, juridical, economic,
demographical, and ecological issues.
Whether China will move in the
direction of "vaulting ambition" (and seek to overthrow the status quo) or else move toward "critical
introspection" (and seek to
restitute itself within a renewed domestic, regional, and international equilibrium) will depend not
merely upon the outcome and actions of
China's internal debate, but also how the external world translates, and then
acts in response, to that debate.
The
Geohistorical Past
Much
as the rise of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) can not entirely be understood outside
the disintegration of the Qing empire into
warring states and war lords and the subsequent struggle
between Chiang Kai Chek and Mao Ze Dong
in the interwar period, the rise of the Ming and Qing dynasties cannot
first be understood without
reference to the crisis created by the division of China into five dynasties
and ten kingdoms.
Divided into five dynasties and ten kingdoms in the period from 907 to
960 AD, the northern Song took
steps toward imperial reconsolidation
(in conflict with
the Kingdoms of
Xixia and Khitan) in the period 960-1127.
With North China lost to the Jurchen Tartars (who forced Korea to
recognize their suzereignty in 1123), the Song escaped to Hangzhou to
set up
the Southern Song
dynasty (1127-1279). With the West cut off, maritime routes in the south and southeast replaced the Silk Road
as the main route of trade. Arab
merchants consequently expanded trade with the south of China at Quanzhou.
The
Mongols were able
to suppress the
warring Xixia in 1227 and
invaded Korea in
1231 (Korea submitted by 1259).
In 1234, the Mongols annexed the Jin,
taking Beijing (and establishing residence at Khanbalik) in
1264, before taking the Southern
Song, thus forging the Yuan dynasty
from 1271-1368. The Mongols
pressed into Champa and Annam (Indochina) to establish a
vassal state, but then failed to establish tributary states in
Burma and Java.
The Mongols did establish a tributary relationship with the Siamese
kingdoms of Xieng-mai
and Sukhotai. The Yuan
ultimately lost political control
over Korea in 1356, although the rise of Confucianism helped to establish permanent imperial and
cultural Sino-Korean ties.
Having
subdued Korea and
most of China, Kubla Kahn attempted
to invade Japan, but failed.
In 1281, he attempted another invasion from bases in China and Korea,
yet was defeated by well-prepared Japanese and
the mythical Kamakazi typhoon. The Yuan Dynasty under the Great Kahn
thus failed in its efforts to achieve hegemony over insular Japan. (The first
naval confrontations between
Japan and China
had occurred in 662 AD during
the Tang period).
The
subsequent Ming dynasty (1368-1644 AD) unified the country.
Chu Yuan Chang (later Hung-wu), a
Buddhist monk, seized Nanjing in 1356 and
then drove the
Mongols from Beijing - an event now celebrated by
the mythical Mid-Autumn Moon festival
and the eating of "mooncakes." By 1382, the Ming conquered
Yunnan, thus putting
the core of China under one
government (Formosa/Taiwan not
included). The Ming dynasty was
highly bureaucratic, a fact
that strengthened the power and
influence of the Mandarins and
the eunuchs. Its Confucian
philosophy generally regarded
trade and industry
as morally suspect,
if not corrupting to
"pure" Chinese values.
Moreover, the Academy of Letters (which produced the Yung Lo
Ta Tien encyclopedia in the period 1403-09)
led a bitter campaign against the impact of all foreign influences.
Nevertheless, despite bureaucratic
opposition, the Ming leadership did begin a relatively brief effort (that is,
from a long term historical
perspective) to achieve
a blue water navy and an overseas hegemony and system of tribute in the period 1405 to 1433 AD. As it
briefly expanded as an amphibious
power, China began to forge overseas protectorates over Borneo,
many states within Malaysia,
Ceylon, as well as over peoples in the
Red Sea and the coast of Africa. By the time of his seventh cruise in 1431-33,
some twenty states
had begun to send tribute back
to China, including Mecca. In effect,
the latter established a durable Sino-Islamic
connection.
Interestingly, China's
period of overseas expansion
occurred just following the death of Timur (Tamerlane), who had
proclaimed his mission to restore
the Mongol empire. After conquering Persia, Mesopotamia, and
Afghanistan, Timur invaded India (devastating Delhi) in 1398-99, and then defeated
the Ottoman Turcs at the battle of Angora in 1402. Timur
then died in 1405 before beginning
a "Holy War" against
China. His death consequently led to
the decay of the Timurid empire and put to an end the threat of Mongolian revanche
- or at least lessened that threat in the near term. Ming campaigns
in 1410, 1414, 1422-24 into Outer Mongolia were consequently aimed at preventing
Mongolian chieftains from once again organizing their
revenge. Here, it
would appear that the lack of a significant "threat" to the north permitted China to
advance its overseas interests to the
south. (Cheng Ho’s first voyage may have been intended to protect China’s sea
approaches against an impending Mongol attack that never came.)
Having
suddenly advanced overseas over nearly three decades, China, just
as suddenly and unexpectedly,
ceased its explorations and returned to its continental silkworm cocoon. In doing
so, China lost its trade in the Indian Ocean to the Arabs and the
Portuguese. The imperial court not only
banned naval expeditions to Indian Ocean after 1433 but, in 1436, an imperial
decree forbade the construction of new blue water ships. Sailors were
ordered to man the internal sea routes and canals for
purposes of internal trade, hence avoiding the risky sea coast,
which was subject to bad weather and
piracy. [McNeill 1982: 45-46] China's
turn toward introspection did
not, however, stop its progress: The
Ming period led
to significant technological developments, in meteorology, for example, as
well as in
rocketry involving the development of the first
one stage rocket (the Fire Raven) plus a two stage rocket (the Fire Dragon).
A number of reasons have been offered
for the sudden reversal in its
overseas policy:[Wallerstein
1974: 51-63]
1) The Confucian mandarins lacked any sense of
a colonizing mission and feared the
corrupting influence of
foreigners. Cheng Ho was a
eunuch of Moslem origin and
thus
overseas voyages were associated
with foreigners.
2) The
reappearance of the threat from Mongol nomad barbarians and of Japanese Wako
pirates may have diverted imperial attention
away from overseas expansion;
3) Overseas
systems of "tribute"
may have been seen as costly and
disadvantageous to the
empire, if not a net drain on
the imperial treasury;
4) Efforts to sustain hegemony over Annam
(Indochina) in the period
1428-1447 suffered
a number of setbacks, leading to
withdrawal in 1428; [McNeill 1982: 46]
5) Efforts
to repress internal rebellions may have been costly;
6) The
shift of the capital to Beijing in 1421, and the extension of the
Great Wall, may
have shifted policy interests to the
north, possibly in accord with a
shift in population to
the north; [McNeill 1982: 46]
7) Labor
intensive rice production
did not require
colonial expansion in the same
way that production of cereal and
wheat, or else a
pastoral economy, did
for the West
(although China did expand upon Eurasian pastoral areas and
through its Silk Road trade
on the continent);
8) And finally,
the more centralized and less competitive Chinese system of
prebendalism
did not lend itself to overseas expansion
as did the more decentralized
and
competitive system of Western feudalism, which permitted greater
individual and
corporate initiative. (There was
little profit involved
in overseas ventures,
particularly as it involved
significant bribery of Chinese Mandarin officials.)
Threats from Mongols, the Jurchen, and "Japanese" pirates (who
were not always from
Japan and included
Chinese fugitives and even black slaves
who had escaped from Macao) continued to exacerbate
tensions in the north and along the coast. Acts of piracy were
quite significant up until the 1570s
and represented major threats to
China's coastal well being. By the
1590s, a new threat appeared: Japan invaded Korea (1592-93 and 1597-98),
impelling the Chinese to support their loyal Korean ally at a high cost. (The Korean Li dynasty had
based its legitimacy upon a close
relationship with the
Chinese Ming dynasty in 1392.)
Domestic turmoil then led Japan to
withdraw its troops in 1598. Conflict with the Jurchens in Manchuria began to intensify and then forced
a rise in taxes at least seven times
between 1618-1639.
With
natural disasters, tax
increases, domestic rebellion, and financial crises
involving the changing ratio of silver to copper due to the
gradual integration of China's
economy into the world economy, Ming
governance began to
collapse, leading to
armed revolt and
Manchu conquest. For whatever
may be the primary reason, China continued to let its naval capacity rust to the point that it could
hardly defend itself against piracy or against the new, ultimately more
devastating, influence of the wai guo ren
(foreigners).
"Special Enterprise Zones": Keeping
Barbarians at Arms Length
Cheng Ho's voyages took
place prior to the more long-lasting overseas Portuguese expansion
under Prince Henry
the Navigator who, largely insulated from European wars
(until Portugal was taken by Spain in 1580), began to explore the
coast of Africa between 1421 to 1460. By 1510-11 Lisbon had established bases in Goa and Malacca
before reaching China in 1514 at the entrance of the Xia river close to
Canton. It was not until 1557 that the Portuguese established a permanent
trading post on Macao, ruled by their
own government in pursuit of commercial profit, and which established the compradores as treaty port merchants and
intermediaries between foreign businesses
and China. It was, in many ways,
the first "special enterprise zone," one under a Chinese system of
tribute.
While
Spain barely touched
the Chinese mainland,
Manilla in the Philippines
became the major entrepot in the expanding system of
trade between China and
Europe. Mexican silver was used
to purchase Chinese silk (along with
Southeast Asian pepper);
at the same time, Chinese merchants
began to settle in the Philippines to profit from
burgeoning trade relations. By 1575, the King of Luzon of the
Philippines likewise became
tributary to the
Chinese empire - in part to
counterbalance the influence of Spain,
that is, until the Spanish opted to wipe out the
Chinese population in Manilla in 1662.
The
Dutch, in rivalry with Spain, prior to the formal independence of
the Netherlands in 1648, established connections on the Isle
of Java in 1595. By 1622
the Dutch established
a small fort next to a Chinese
fishing village on
the Pescadores, where
they had been driven after failing
to establish a hold on the mainland. Up until the late
14th or early 15th century,
Formosa had been
sparsely populated (largely by head-hunting tribes related to the
Philippino Luzon).
Yet
by 1624, the
Dutch were able
to establish a protected fort, Zelandia, on Taiwan itself, and
they proceeded to develop the interior. The
Dutch produced and
exported sugar, rice, coal for
both Asian and European markets from
Taiwan. Dutch industry
in turn attracted impoverished labor
from the mainland (from Fujian and Guangdong) despite laws against
immigration. (Although interested
in maritime trade, the Southern Song and the Ming dynasty had done
little to develop Taiwan which had formerly been explored by the
Han [206 BC- 24 AD] and the Tang [618-907 AD] dynasties.)
During
years of opposition to Manchu rule (1673-83), in 1662 the Ming loyalist,
Zheng Cheng-gong (known
to the Portugese as Koxinga),
took refuge on the island with his militias, and forced the Dutch off Formosa
in eight months, after having seized
Amoy in 1653, Ch'ung-ming island in
1656, and attacking Nanjing in 1657. The Dutch then
switched sides and moved their fleet to
support the Manchus in their battle in 1663-64. Zheng's naval power
and potential influence among the population was regarded in awe by 1661. In an effort to block trade
and isolate anti-Manchu forces the Manchus ordered an evacuation of the coastal
population to a depth of ten miles from the sea despite the hardships. Thus,
while Taiwan had initially been under Dutch control from 1624 to 1662, it then
fell to Ming loyalists from 1662 (after a long siege) to 1683, in effect,
establishing an alternative government and claimant to imperial power.
The
Qing (1664-1911) consequently defeated their rival claimants by
first occupying the
Pescadore islands. They were
then able to build a garrison on
Formosa in 1683 thus solidifying control over "all" of China and
placing Formosa under
imperial administration as a tributary of Fujian.
Territorial Expansion under the Qing
China's
widest expansion came
under the Manchu Qing dynasty in the
period from 1683-1830. Having conquered China's core
provinces and then Formosa, the Qing
turned toward westward expansion to establish a circle of "buffer
zones" or protectorates over Mongolia in 1696 and Tibet in 1724, and then engaging in wars of colonization in
Dzungaria (east Turkestan) in 1729-34; 1754-61; Burma (1767-69), and in Tibet
(1751-52).
In regard to the latter, China first
placed imperial troops in Tibet in
1720, in support
of a popular Tibetan candidate,
after the West Mongolian Jungars had attempted to impose an imperial candidate
as dalai lama in 1714. By 1747-1749, Beijing was unable to restore order in
Tibet, leading to
the 1751 invasion
and the Chinese efforts to
control the succession and non-spiritual "material world" politics of
the dalai lama.
While
the Dutch had pressed toward China's coasts from the
south, the Manchus moved in from the
north. The latter thus conquered Beijing in
1644, and then
moved to take over the rest of China. Ironically
this occurred as the Russians
simultaneously thrust into the Amur River valley in northern Manchuria
in the 1640s. Despite continuing clashes, Russia and
the Manchus signed
the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, in part due to Chinese
efforts to prevent a
Russian-Mongol alliance. The latter treaty
is interesting in
that it represented a departure from the traditional Chinese
practice "since the
Empire did not conceptually recognize the existence of
juridical frontiers."
[Mancall 1984: 77] The Russians, however,
pushed for a
more definitive treaty,
resulting in the
1728 Treaty of Kyahkta, which
created the diplomatic mechanism
for the resolution
of disputes. The treaty terms compelling observance were only invoked
three times from 1728 to 1860. [Mancall 1984: 79]
Owen Lattimore has argued that Chinese
territorial expansion largely followed
classical lines in
that China recognized
that there were diminishing returns.
China's expansion as
far as Outer Mongolia "was primarily for the purpose of breaking up threatening
concentrations of tribal power in the transfrontier, not for the purpose of
acquiring new territory,
administering it directly,
and integrating it closely with China." [Lattimore 1962: 171] Over
time, however, Chinese "internal" colonization and immigration has
worked to create closer bonds and political-economic ties between the core of China and its internal continental
protectorates - as well as with Taiwan.
Overseas Outreach: Taiwan
In
regard to its
southern and overseas
interests, the Qing was
circumspect. Having taken
Taiwan and making it an
appendage of Fujian province in 1683, the Qing attitude toward Taiwan remained
ambivalent. It failed to develop
Taiwan significantly in fear of
the fact that freer trade would cause
social unrest, open China up to its foreign enemies, drain silver
from the country, and encourage
piracy, and other crimes.[Spence 1990: 56-57]
The late 17th century
Qing court debated the fate of Taiwan (which
suggests a debate relevant to today): "Some courtiers suggested that it
be abandoned altogether, whereas Admiral
Shi urged that it be made a fortified
base to protect
China from the
‘strong, huge invincible’ warships of the Dutch." [Spence 1990: 57]
At
least initially, the Manchu Qing
government did everything in its power
to prevent Taiwan's
development and suppressed revolts in 1721; 1747-49; 1755-79;
and 1786-87. By the 19th century, however, the Qing
dynasty had no choice but
to develop Taiwan when
confronted by conflicting Japanese and
European interests in
the island. The Qing government
refused to claim absolute
sovereignty over the entire island (only
over ethnic Chinese
on the coast) until challenged
to do so by Japan in 1874. The incident
demonstrated the weakness of the Chinese navy
and military, and
helped provide greater
political impetus for the
"self-strengthening" movement of Li Hongzhang.
China
then opened up the island to Chinese immigration, but failed to
develop it properly. Then in the
1884-85 war with France over Indochina,
France blockaded the
island. Previously under
Fujian's provincial administration, the Chinese declared
Taiwan a province in its own right
(giving Taiwanese a new, even more autonomous identity) in the effort to
break set patterns of corruption and to modernize it, particularly in the
period 1870-1890 under Governor Liu.
Korea
The
1842 Opium wars
further opened Chinese
society to Western
influence and opium,
humiliating the imperial Manchu leadership as did the
occupation of Beijing
by British and French forces in 1860 (who burned and
looted the summer palace). The 1850-64 Taiping and 1851-1868 Nian
rebellions further weakened the imperial court's capacity to govern
the country. China's imperial expanse dwindled step by step, and very
quickly by the late 19th century. China was forced to give the Russians
(in the "unequal
treaties") the Amur
in 1858 (after the Treaty of Tientsin) and
then the Coastal
provinces in 1860
following the occupation of
Beijing by the
British and the
French. (The Coastal provinces
included Vladivostok later
claimed by Mao.) In 1887, Portugal obtained
the secession of Macao, but at the same time, promised not
to alienate it. By 1890, the Board of Admiralty was abolished - indicating the
total disarray of the Chinese navy.
The
rise of Japan
finally forced China
to abandon its
Korean protectorate in 1876
when Japan forced Korea to sign an unequal treaty modeled upon those
treaties the Europeans had forced upon the Chinese! In the Sino-French
wars from 1883-85,
China lost its vassal states in Indochina. In the
1894-95 Sino-Japanese war, Korea called upon both China and Japan to assist it against internal
insurrection, but Japan used the opportunity
to seize Korea, forcing Chinese out, in addition to
taking Taiwan as a
by-product, in part to preclude east Asian colonization by the West
and to prevent China from loaning the Pescadore islands to the
French. (After the
war, in 1895, a secret
Sino-Russian agreement gave Russia
the right to
develop a rail system to
Vladivostok - a fact that would help lead to the Russo-Japanese war of
1904-05.)
The
1894-95 Sino-Japanese war consequently led to an even greater
"scramble for concessions" by the British, French, Russians, Germans,
and the Americans. Following the
Rebellion of the « Righteous Fists of Harmony » in 1900, and military intervention by the
Europeans and the Americans, China was forced to cede Manchuria to Russia in
the period from 1900-05 and was forced into further humiliation. The American « Open Door »
policy was as much directed
at the Russians as at the Europeans, but permitted U.S. entry
into the region
following the 1898 Spanish-American War,
in which the United States was able to obtain the former Chinese tributary
state, the Philippines, after a brutal
conflict with Philippino opponents of American annexation. Manila was to be the
American « Hong Kong. »
Russian expansion continued up
to the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War when
Japan acted to
preclude further Russian
military and political-economic outreach by means
of the Transiberian railway. In 1907,
the British and
Russians shocked the
world by forging
an Anglo-Russian entente that affected relations with Persia, Afghanistan,
and China. Tibet (which had
been under a Chinese
protectorate since 1750-51) was made
a neutral buffer, becoming autonomous by 1912. Outer Mongolia likewise
became autonomous in
1911 (recognized by China in
1913).
The
1904-05 Russo-Japanese war,
ironically enough, led to promises of
imperial reforms in
both Russia and China. In China, the dowager empress had
revoked progress made in the Hundred
Days of Reform in 1898; by 1908,
following the death of the emperor and of the dowager
empress, a draft constitution was published, but the government remained
in Manchu hands. The 1911
revolution, however, established
a national assembly, which was then dissolved by its president Yuan Shih-k'ai
in opposition to the Kuo Ming
Tang (KMT) led
by Sun Yat Sen. The failure of imperial reforms in
both countries would, in part, led to revolution in China in 1911 and in
Russia in 1917. At the same time the collapse of both empires would set the
stage for Japan's Twenty-One Demands of 1915 and ultimately for Japanese
expansion into Manchuria.
In
sum, China reached its summit of its grandeur in the Qing period
but began to overextend itself. Its
initial territorial expansion, prior to
the devastating fall
of its « mandate from heaven », however, continues to set
the framework for contemporary China's interactions with
its immediate neighbors, as well
as with overseas powers, in that the People's Republic has yet
to cede its
geohistorical claims, raising fears and creating uncertainty among its
neighbors.
The Cold War
In the post-World War II period, both
China and the Soviet Union began to
review their relations with Mongolia and Xinjiang first as allies (in the
period 1950-1958) and then as rivals (in the late 1960s to
1980s). Indian independence likewise
meant a review of common Sino-Indian land frontiers, and of
Tibet's "buffer" status in particular. The escape of Chiang
Kai Chek to Taiwan in 1949 raised the question that
had haunted the Manchus following
the escape of Ming loyalist
Zheng to Formosa in period 1662-83. At the same time, these geopolitical events
took place in a new systemic
geohistorical context in which China has been increasingly integrated in
"World History" both in geoeconomic and geostrategic terms.
Following unification in 1949, China opted to absorb Tibet at the
onset of the Korean War
(to preclude U.S.
support for Tibetan independence), and
likewise absorbed East Turkestan (to forestall pan-Turk, pan Pan-Islam movements in
Xinjiang province). In effect, these actions removed the buffer between Russia,
China, and India over Afghanistan
and Tibet that had previously
been established by the 1907 Anglo-Russian entente.
In
addition to supporting the
"anti-imperialist" struggle of North
Korea and North Vietnam, and attempting to pressure the United States
and Taiwan by shelling the islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the 1950s,
the People's Republic began to
expand its influence overseas in the 1960s upon an
ostensibly "rational" ideological basis, forging military and trading
links with Pakistan
and Iran (the Sino-Islamic connection) as well as African
regimes such as Tanzania, for example. But contrary to its myth of
support for anti-Soviet anti-American revolutionary political movements, China was in many ways retracing its
geohistorical pattern of external outreach in
terms of the
formation of tributary (and not necessarily lucrative)
arrangements as first outlined by Cheng Ho.
During
the Cold War,
Beijing attempted to take advantage of U.S.-Soviet rivalry
as a tertius gaudens
power, in what
was more appropriately called
a "Game of
Go" than the more often
referred to "Great Game" of Asia. The latter was Rudyard Kipling's
expression which largely referred to the repetitive nature of conflict between
Britain and Czarist Russia, and which then appeared to repeat itself in
Afghanistan once Pax Americana had fully replaced the global
insular-hegemonic role of the former
Pax Britannica. The
Game of Go
thus refers to U.S.-Soviet-Chinese games of "encirclement" and
"counter-encirclement."
In
the "Game of Go" Beijing sought to play Soviet
versus American interests, tilting first toward Moscow in 1950 following the
formation of NATO, but then falling into self-imposed isolation and
inner turmoil of the Cultural
Revolution following Khrushchev's 1959 rupture. By 1967-68, Beijing began to
break out of that isolation with ping-pong diplomacy and the opening to the
United States under Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. In a
step that was
intended to "appease" the
People's Republic,
Washington removed Taipei
from the UN Security Council and replaced it with Beijing.
By 1978, President
Carter's National Security
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski attempted to play the so-called "China
Card."[iii] The United States opted for diplomatic recognition of Beijing, but
without first having demanded that
Beijing renounce the use of force against Taiwan as urged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [Gardner 1994: 96
and passim]
U.S.
policy, however, represented
an unsuccessful effort to turn Beijing into a long-term
"active strategic counterweight" against Moscow. China began,
ironically, to shift back toward Moscow during the 1980s
when it appeared that President Ronald
Reagan would not entirely give up support
for Taiwan (even following the
1982 Second Shanghai Communiqué) in
accord with his
more traditional anti-Soviet and anti- "Chi-Com"
ideology that dated from the 1950s. Beijing likewise refused to provide
diplomatic recognition to
those countries that recognized Taiwan as an « independent » state - in an effort to intimidate and
isolate the island.
Moscow
first sought to
woo Beijing with Leonid
Brezhnev's peace offensive and the
1982 Tashkent address. Then under Mikhail Gorbachev, Moscow began to address the three obstacles to
peace: Soviet involvement in
Afghanistan, Soviet support
for Vietnam in Kampuchea/Cambodia, and
Soviet troops along
the Sino-Soviet border.
Contrary to the view of
American pundits at the time,
China and the Soviet Union were, step-by-step, able to mend fences. At the same time, China has been
able to pressure
or assert its influence over
Vietnam (but unable to defeat
Hanoi militarily in 1978-79), Cambodia (in tacit support of the Khmer
Rouge), and the two Koreas. (In the case of the latter, China gave positive
support in promoting the October 1994 Geneva agreement in which North Korea
agreed to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear weapons program. On the
other hand, a nuclear China has given support to both the Iranian and Pakistani
nuclear programs - primarily in an effort to counterbalance its rival India
whose own nuclear program has been
assisted, at least in part, by Russia - in a post-Cold War continuation of the
« Game of Go. »)
Despite
Soviet implosion (Deng Xiao Ping
justified his repression of
students in June
1989 on Tiananmen square on the basis that the Soviet failure to crush the Solidarity movement in Poland
ultimately led to the Soviet collapse),
Russia and China
have reconfirmed closer ties. The Russians believe that they
are now playing their own version of the "China
Card." At the same time, the Chinese have been playing "barbarians
against barbarians," as described by Wei Yuan. [Edward 1984]
The Chinese Game of Go has extended itself even further to include the European Union (but often playing French versus German interests) and playing EU and Japanese interests against each other, in addition to playing Moscow against Washington in an effort to expand Chinese geostrategic and geopolitical-economic power, influence, and position. On the one hand, China has protested against U.S. efforts to rebuild Japanese military capabilities and to possibly permit Japan a more active role in the defense of Taiwan; on the other hand, China recognizes the U.S. role in "double-containing" Japanese power. In effect, a strong American diplomatic<