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Published in "Asianists' ASIA" Edited by T.Wignesan in Paris, France. See: http://stateless.freehosting.net/menupage.htm
for other issues of the journal
Caste in Indian
Muslim Society
Professor Yoginder Singh Sikand,
Head,
Centre for
Studies on Indian Muslims,
New Delhi
Introduction
Although the Qur'an insists on the radical equality of all Muslims, caste (zat, jati, biraderi) remains a defining
feature of Indian Muslim society, with significant regional variations. While
the severity of caste among the Indian Muslims is hardly as acute as among the
Hindus, with the practice of untouchability being virtually absent, caste and
associated notions of caste-based superiority and inferiority still do play an
important role in Indian Muslim society. In most parts of
Most studies of caste in
However, as several studies on caste among
the Indian Muslims have shown, while the influence of Hindu social mores on the
Muslims might partially explain the continued salience of caste among them it
does not fully explain how the Muslims of the region came to be stratified on
the basis of caste in the first place. It also ignores the role of sections of
the 'ulama, scholars of Islamic
jurisprudence, in providing religious legitimacy to caste with the help of the concept
of kafa'a.
This article begins with a brief note on caste among the Indian Muslims,
seeking to provide an explanation of the phenomenon based on the historical
evolution of the Muslim community in
Caste Among the Indian Muslims
The vast majority of the Indian Muslims are descendants
of converts from what is today called 'Hinduism'. Individual conversions to
Islam in medieval times were rare. Rather, typically, entire local caste groups
or significant sections thereof underwent a gradual process of Islamisation, in
the course of which elements of the Islamic faith were gradually incorporated
into local cosmologies and ritual practice while gradually displacing or replacing
local or 'Hindu' elements. In other words, conversion was both a social as well
as a gradual process. Because it was a collective social process, the original
endogamous circle prior to conversion was still preserved even after the group
undergoing the process had witnessed a significant degree of cultural change.
Hence, even after conversion to Islam marriage continued to take place within
the original caste group. This is how Muslim society came to be characterized
by the existence of multiple endogamous caste-like groups. Because mass
conversion to Islam was also rarely, if ever, a sudden event, but, rather, generally
took the form of a gradual process of cultural change, often extending over
generations, many of the converts retained several of their local, pre-Islamic
beliefs and practices. It was thus not the influence of Hinduism among a
previously 'pure', 'uncontaminated' Muslim community as such, but, rather, the
continued impact of Hindu beliefs and customs on the converts who still
remained within a largely Hindu cultural universe and retained many of its
associated beliefs and practices, that explains the continued hold of
caste-related practices and assumptions among large sections of the Indian
Muslim community.
The Ashraf-Ajlaf Divide
Scholarly writings on caste among Indian Muslims generally note the division
that is often made between the so-called
'noble' castes or ashraf and those labeled as inferior, or razil, kamin or ajlaf. The ashraf-ajlaf division is not the
invention of modern social scientists, for it is repeatedly mentioned in medieval
works of ashraf scholars themselves.
To these writers, Muslims of Arab, Central Asian, Iranian and Afghan extraction
were superior in social status than local converts. This owed not just to
racial differences, with local converts generally being dark-skinned and the ashraf lighter complexioned, but also to
the fact that the ashraf belonged to
the dominant political elites, while the bulk of the ajlaf remained associated with ancestral professions as artisans
and peasants which were looked down upon as inferior and demeaning.
In order to provide suitable legitimacy to their claims of social superiority,
medieval Indian ashraf scholars wrote
numerous texts that sought to interpret the Qur'an to suit their purposes, thus
effectively denying the Qur'an's message of radical social equality.
Pre-Islamic Persian notions of the divine right of kings and the nobility, as
opposed to the actual practice of the Prophet and the early Muslim community,
seem to have exercised a powerful influence on these writers. A classical,
oft-quoted example in this regard is provided by the Fatawa-i Jahandari, written
by the fourteenth century Turkish scholar, Ziauddin Barani, a leading courtier
of Muhammad bin Tughlaq, Sultan of Delhi. This text is the only known surviving
Indo-Persian treatise exclusively devoted to political theory from the period
of the Delhi Sultanate.
The Fatawa-i Jahandari shows Barani as a fervent champion of ashraf supremacy and as vehemently
opposed to the ajlaf. In appealing to
the Sultan to protect the ashraf and
keep the ajlaf firmly under their control
and submission he repeatedly refers to the Qur'an, from which he seeks to
derive legitimacy from his arguments. His is not a rigorous scholarly approach
to the Qur'an, however, for he conveniently misinterprets it to support the
hegemonic claims of the ashraf,
completely ignoring the Qur'an's insistence on social equality. In the process,
he develops a doctrine and social vision for the ideal Muslim ruler, which, in
their implications for what Barani calls the 'low-born', are hardly different
in their severity than the classical Hindu law of caste as contained in the Manusmriti, the Brahminical law code.
As Barani's translator, Mohammad Habib, writes, 'Barani's God, as is quite
clear from his work, has two aspects-first, he is the tribal deity of the Musalmans;
secondly, as between the Musalmans themselves, He is the tribal deity of
well-born uslims'.[1] Barani was not
a lone voice in his period, however, for he seems to echo a widely shared understanding
of ashraf supremacy held by many of his ashraf contemporaries, including leading 'ulama and Sufis.
Barani's disdain for the 'low' born is well illustrated in his advice to the
Sultan about education of the ajlaf.
While the Qur'an and the traditions attributed to the Prophet repeatedly stress
the need for all Muslims, men and women, rich and poor, to acquire knowledge,
Barani insists that the Sultan should consider it his religious duty to deny the
ajlaf access to knowledge, branding
them as 'mean', and 'despicable'. Thus, he advises the Sultan:
Teachers of every kind are to
be sternly ordered not
to thrust precious stones down
the throats of dogs or
to put collars of gold round
the necks of pigs and
bears, that is, to the mean,
the ignoble and the
worthless, to shopkeepers and
to the low-born they are
to teach nothing more than the
rules about prayer,
fasting, religious charity and
the haj pilgrimage,
along with some chapters of the
Qur'an and some
doctrines of the faith, without which
their religion
cannot be correct and valid
prayers are not possible.
But they are to be taught
nothing else, lest it bring
honour to their mean souls.[2]
As Barani sees it, if the ajlaf were
allowed access to education, they might challenge ashraf hegemony. Therefore, he sternly warns the Sultan:
They are not to be taught
reading and writing, for
plenty of disorders arise owing
to the skill of the
low born in knowledge. The
disorder into which all
affairs of the religion and the
state are thrown is
due to the acts and words of
the low born, who have
become skilled. For, on account
of their skill, they
become governors (wali), revenue-collectors ('amils),
auditors (mutassarif), officers (farman
deh) and
rulers (farman rawa). If teachers are disobedient, and
it is discovered at the time of
investigation that
they have imparted knowledge or
taught letters or
writing to the low born,
inevitably the punishment for
their disobedience will be
meted out to them.[3]
In order to bolster his assertion that the Sultan should ensure that the ajlaf remain subservient to the ashraf, Barani seeks appropriate
religious sanction. Thus, he asserts:
[.] to promote base, mean,
low-born and worthless men
to be the helpers and
supporters of the government has
not been permitted by any
religion, creed, publicly
accepted tradition or
state-law.[4]
He then goes on to elaborate a theory of the innate inferiority of the ajlaf, the superiority of the ashraf and the divine right of the
Sultan to rule, based on a distorted interpretation of Islam. Thus, he writes
that the 'merits' and 'demerits' of all people have been 'apportioned at the
beginning of time and allotted to their souls'. Hence, people's acts are not of
their own volition, but, rather, an expression and result of 'Divine
commandments'. God Himself, Barani claims, has decided that the ajlaf be confined to 'inferior'
occupations, for He is said to have made them 'low born, bazaar people, base,
mean, worthless, plebian, shameless and of dirty birth'. God has given them
'base' qualities, such as 'immodesty, wrongfulness, injustice, cruelty,
non-recognition of rights, shamelessness, impudence, blood-shedding, rascality,
jugglery and Godlessness' that are
suitable only for such professions. Furthermore, these base qualities are
inherited from father to son, and so the ajlaf
must not attempt to take up professions reserved by God for the ashraf even if they are qualified to do so,
for this would be a grave violation of the Divine Will. Likewise, Barani
claims, God has bestowed the ashraf
with noble virtues by birth itself, and these are transmitted hereditarily.
Hence, they alone have the right and responsibility of taking up 'noble' occupations,
such as ruling, teaching and preaching the faith.[5]
Since God is held to have made the ajlaf
innately despicable and base, to promote them would be a gross violation of the
divine plan. 'In the promotion of the low and low-born brings', Barani argues,
' there is no advantage in this world, for it is impudent to act against the
wisdom of Creation'. Hence, he insists that if the Sultan confers any post in
his court or
government service to the ajlaf, the
'court and the high position of the king will be disgraced, the people of God
will be distressed and scattered, the objectives of the government will not be
attained, and, finally, the king will be punished on the day of Judgment'. In
this regard, he refers to a tradition attributed to the Prophet, according to
which Muhammad is said to have declared, 'The vein is deceptive'. Although this
tradition might be interpreted to suggest that one's social status does not
depend on one's heredity, Barani offers a novel explanation of the tradition to
suggest precisely the opposite conclusion, that 'the good vein and the bad vein
draw towards virtue and vice', and that 'in the well-born and the noble only
virtue and loyalty appear, while from the man of low birth and bad birth only wickedness
and destruction originate'. Likewise, he provides a novel interpretation of a
Qur'anic verse (xlix: 13) to support his claim of ashraf superiority. He quotes the Qur'an as saying that God honours
the pious, a statement that has generally been read to suggest that superiority
in God's eyes depends on one's piety and not birth, to arrive at precisely the opposite
conclusion. The verse, he says, implies that '[.] it ought to be known that in
the impure and impure-born and low and low-born, there can be no piety'.[6]
As Barani's writings on the ajlaf so
clearly suggest, many medieval ashraf
scholars shared a common understanding of the 'low-born' as born to serve the ashraf. Accordingly, to legitimize this
claim they interpreted the Qur'an as sanctioning a sternly hierarchical social
order, with the subordinate status of the ajlaf
ascribed to the Divine Will. As H.N.Ansari, a contemporary Indian Muslim
scholar and an activist of a 'low' caste Muslim organization, remarks, this
represented a profoundly 'un-Islamic' reading of the Qur'an, which stresses the
equality of all Muslims and lays down piety as the only criterion for merit in God's
eyes. Yet, Ansari adds, men like Barani exercised a powerful influence in their
times with their wrong interpretations of the Qur'an, resulting in the
'complete betrayal of the Qur'anic precepts of brotherhood'.[7]
To imagine, as some writers today assert, a solidly egalitarian Muslim
community pitted against a sternly hierarchical Hindu community in medieval
India is thus hardly convincing. Nor, for that matter, is the explanation of
the existence of caste and social hierarchy among Muslims as a result of the
baneful impact of hierarchical Hinduism on egalitarian Islam. Although the
impact of the wider Hindu society on the beliefs and practices of the Muslims
is obvious, in the face of hierarchical notions of religion and the normative
social order as reflected in the writings of Barani, it is obvious that the
Muslim elite played an equally central role in promoting and preserving social
hierarchy by seeking to provide it with suitable 'Islamic' sanction. The effort
to legitimize caste in 'Islamic' terms was given further impetus by the 'ulama
through the notion of kafa'a, to
which we now turn.
Kafa'a and the Legitimisation of Caste by the Indian 'Ulama
The Qur'an and the genuine Prophetic traditions consider
Muslims as equals, and hence allow for any Muslim to marry a suitable Muslim
spouse. In deciding an ideal marriage partner the Qur'an suggests the criteria
of piety (taqwa) and faith (iman), regarding these, rather than
birth or wealth, as the only mark of a person's nearness to God. It is clear from
the records of the Prophet and his companions that this principle was actually
acted upon. Thus, for instance, we hear of instances of slave men or recently
freed slaves marrying free women with the Prophet's consent.
Over time, however, as Islam spread to new regions outside the confines of the
Qur'an and to the early Muslim community were gradually incorporated into the corpus of writings of Islamic
jurisprudence or fiqh.
One manifestation of this was the central importance that the fuqaha
or scholars of the different schools of
Islamic jurisprudence now began paying to the notion of equality of status
in matters of marriage or kafa'a.
Elaborate rules were constructed, built on the notion of kafa'a that specified the 'equals' whom one could legitimately
marry. Taking a spouse from outside one's kafa'a
was sternly frowned upon, if not explicitly forbidden by the fuqaha. In the face of Qur'anic and
genuine Prophetic traditions that stressed that the only basis for selecting
one's marital partner was piety, the scripturalist sources of Islam were
suitably misinterpreted to provide legitimacy for notions of kafa'a based on wealth and birth,
including ethnicity.
These debates on kafa'a have a direct
bearing on how the Indian Muslim 'ulama have looked at the question of caste,
caste endogamy and inter-caste relations. Since the vast majority of the Indian
Muslims follow the Hanafi school, the opinions of the classical Hanafi 'ulama
on kafa'a continue to determine the attitudes
of the Indian 'ulama on the question of caste and social hierarchy. Most Indian
Hanafis seem to have regarded caste (biraderi),
understood here as hereditary occupational group, as an essential factor in
deciding kafa'a, and in this way have
provided fiqh legitimacy to the
notion of caste.
The detailed debates among the fuqaha
of the law schools about kafa'a need
not detain us here, and it is sufficient to mention that they differed somewhat
on the criterion for deciding it. 'Abdul Hamid Nu'mani, a contemporary Indian
Muslim scholar, writes that many classical fuqaha
considered the following issues to decide one's kafa'a for purposes of marriage: legal status as free or enslaved (azadi); economic status (maldari); occupation (pesha); intelligence ('aql); family origin or ethnicity (nasb); absence of bodily defects and
illness; and, finally, piety (taqwa).[8]
All these are said to have been deciding factors for kafa'a for the Hanafis and the Hanbalis, while according to Imam
Malik, the real basis of kafa'a is
said to have been piety. Imam Shafi' is said not to have included wealth in kafa'a. On the whole, however, most fuqaha insisted on taking factors other
than simply piety in deciding kafa'a.[9]
In the Indian context, this expanded notion
of kafa'a, representing a
considerable departure from the Qur'an, was accepted as laying down the norms
for deciding on the legality of a Muslim marriage. By restricting marriage to
one's occupational and ethnic group, caste, which is, in theory, an endogamous
birth-based occupational category, came to be regarded as
essential to establishing kafa'a for
purposes of marriage. In this way, the notion of kafa'a helped to provide legitimacy to the existence of caste among
the Indian Muslims by effectively restricting marriage within the endogamous
caste circle. This is readily apparent even in the fatwa literature produced by
several recent Indian 'ulama, an issue that we now look at.
To illustrate the ways in which significant sections of the Indian 'ulama have
sought to employ the concept of kafa'a to legitimize caste and social
inequality I focus here on a slim Urdu tract on the subject penned by a
contemporary Indian Muslim scholar, Maulana 'Abdul Hamid Nu'mani. A senior
leader of the Jami'at ul-'Ulama-i Hind ('The Union of the 'Ulama of India), Nu'mani
belongs to the Ansari caste of hereditary weavers, traditionally considered by
ashraf Muslims as 'low' in social status. His tract is a modified version of a
speech that he delivered in 1994 at the request of the Anjuman Khuddam
al-Qur'an, a Muslim
missionary organization based at the town of
Nu'mani begins his tract by arguing that the single most important factor for
the spread of Islam in India was the Qur'an's message of radical social
equality (masavat) and respect for
all humankind (ihtiram-i -admiyat).
This naturally appealed most to the downtrodden 'low' castes who were sternly
oppressed by the Brahminical religion and the caste system on which it was
based. The Sufis who propagated Islam among the 'low' castes are said to have
been seriously committed to their welfare, but because their scale of work was so
immense they were unable to properly tend to the proper Islamic instruction of
their neophytes. Therefore, Nu'mani says, the converts retained several of
their pre-Islamic beliefs and practices, including notions of caste. Further,
he writes, caste and related concepts of birth-based ritual status were given
added legitimacy by Muslim rulers and missionaries who had come to India from
the lands of 'ajam, Iran, Turkey and
Central Asia, where concepts of social inequality were already well entrenched.[10]
Nu'mani quotes extensively from Barani's Fatawa-i -Jahandari to show how
discriminatory attitudes towards low-caste converts were widely shared by
medieval Muslim elites. He also comments on the absence of any effective
opposition to such views. In fact, he goes so far as to claim that, 'From
Barani's time till 1947 the notion of Muslim society being divided into ashraf and ajlaf, high and low, was continuously present'. He refers to some
twentieth century Indian 'ulama of his own Deobandi school as opposing
caste-based inequality among the Indian Muslims but laments that 'this sickness
has not as yet been fully eliminated'. He admits that although the caste system
is less severe among the Muslims than it is among the Hindus, in that untouchability
is absent among the former, with caste playing a determining role only in
marriage among Muslims. Yet, he pleads for Muslims to combat notions of caste
based superiority and inferiority, for only then, he argues, can efforts to
spread Islam among 'low' caste Hindus be effective. For this purpose, he says,
a radical revisioning of the concept of kafa'a
is urgently required.[11]
The remainder of the text consists of an elaborate discussion of the notion of kafa'a. In the process of developing a
Qur'anic notion of kafa'a, Nu'mani surveys notions of kafa'a as developed by the classical fuqaha and further elaborated upon by various Indian 'ulama. Since
his concern is to revive the original Qur'anic notion of kafa'a, which alone he sees as normative and binding, he engages in
a process of ijtihad (although he
does not refer to it as such), refusing to remain tied down by formulations of kafa'a as contained in the corpus of fiqh, including the Hanafi school with
which he is associated. In evoking what he calls the true Islamic position on kafa'a, he has four broad objectives.
Firstly, to revive the original message of radical social equality of the Qur'an
which he sees many later 'ulama as having distorted, wilfully or otherwise.
Secondly, to combat caste-based divisions among the Muslims and thereby to promote
Muslim unity. Thirdly, to disprove claims of critics that Islam is not an
egalitarian religion and that, therefore, it cannot provide equality to 'low' caste
Hindu converts. Finally, to provide an understanding of kafa'a that, being liberated from notions of caste, can help in
integrating converts into the mainstream of Muslim society through inter-marriage
and thereby remove a major hurdle in the path of Muslim missionary work,
particularly among 'low' caste Hindus.
In doing so, Nu'mani has to deal with reports attributed to the Prophet and
some of his close companions that seem to legitimize social inequality, as well
as the writings of the classical fuqaha
on the subject of kafa'a. As regards
certain hadith which seem to promote
discriminatory attitudes towards people who follow certain 'low' professions,
Nu'mani subjects the lines of transmission (isnad)
as well as content (matn) of these
reports to close scrutiny, concluding that they are fabricated. He explains
some statements by the companions of the Prophet that militate against social
equality by reading them contextually, and hence argues that they are not applicable
for all time. On the restrictive provisions related to kafa'a that the fuqaha
have prescribed, Nu'mani insists that the Qur'an and the genuine Hadith should be the sole criterion for
judging them. Since the corpus of fiqh
is a post-Qur'anic development, and since the fuqaha were mere mortals, although they might have been well
intentioned, Nu'mani suggests that Muslims should not blindly follow their prescriptions
if they violate the Qur'an and the genuine Hadith.
However, rather than opposing the opinions of the fuqaha directly he points to the differences between the different
schools of fiqh, and within each
school the varying opinions of different fuqaha,
on the question of kafa'a,
highlighting those views that support his own radically egalitarian understanding
of kafa'a.
After providing a brief note on the varying definitions of kafa'a in different schools of Islamic jurisprudence, Nu'mani
writes that according to the Qur'an, kafa'a
is based only on piety. Hence, the only criterion for deciding a marriage
partner should, ideally, be his or her personal character and dedication to the
faith. In other words, he suggests, there is no religious bar for a Muslim man
from a low caste or a low caste Hindu convert to Islam to marry a Muslim girl
from a high caste or vice versa. This, of course, goes completely against
dominant notions of kafa'a. Nu'mani
does not openly question the schools of fiqh
as such. Rather, he points to possibilities within the existing schools and to
differences among the fuqaha of the
different schools as well as within each school to press his claim for an
egalitarian reading of kafa'a.
In arguing the case for an egalitarian interpretation of kafa'a, Nu'mani has to contend with traditions that have been used
by many scholars to insist on the need for people to marry within their same
social class. He does not deny the veracity of such claims but interprets them
in a novel way to bolster his argument that cross-class marriages are to be
regarded as legitimate as well. Thus, for instance, he refers to a tradition
according to which the third caliph, 'Umar, refused to let a girl from a rich
family to marry a man from a lower class. Nu'mani does not say that the caliph
was wrong in his pronouncement. Rather, he says, his opinion was correct
because it might be difficult for such a girl to live in poor family without
the comforts to which she was used to before marriage. Hence, for marital
compatibility a rough equality of economic status is indeed preferable. However,
Nu'mani argues, this does not mean that a girl from a rich family cannot marry
a poor man or that equality in economic status is an absolute necessity in
marriage.[12] Nu'mani recognizes that rough equality of economic status is
preferable in marriage partners, but insists that it is not absolutely
essential. To use 'Umar's decision to argue the case that marriage must take
place only within one's social class or caste, is therefore, untenable. Nu'mani
here quotes another, conflicting report attributed to 'Umar, according to which
the caliph declared that in deciding a man's marriage partner he did not
consider her ethnic or economic status.[13]
Likewise, on the question of occupation (pesha)
in determining kafa'a, Nu'mani writes
that many 'ulama have adopted what he calls an 'unnecessarily restrictive'
attitude, which has led to notions of caste superiority and inferiority since
caste is, in theory, also an occupational category. Nu'mani remarks that this
is particularly unfortunate, given that Imam Abu Hanifa, whose school of
jurisprudence most Indian Muslims claim to follow, did not himself consider occupation
as a factor in determining kafa'a.
This is because one's occupation does not always remain the same and can, in
theory, change. Nu'mani also refers to some Hanafi jurists who placed knowledge
('ilm) above profession in deciding kafa'a, thereby allowing a learned
Muslim from a family following a 'low' profession to marry a woman from a
'respectable' family.[14] On the other hand, Nu'mani notes that some Hanafi
'ulama, including Imam Abu Yusuf, a student of Abu Hanifa, did include
occupation in deciding kafa'a, going
so far as to single out the profession of weavers, barbers and tailors as
'despicable'. On the basis of this, Nu'mani says, numerous Hanafi 'ulama have
issued fatwas declaring weavers,
barbers and tailors to be outside the kafa'a
of those who pursue other, more 'respectable', professions.[15] He notes that
some fuqaha have adopted a somewhat
less severe position on the matter by declaring that if a weaver gives up his
profession and takes to trade, then he can be considered the kafa'a of a trader and can marry a
trader's daughter. Not all Hanafi 'ulama were ready to provide this concession,
however. Nu'mani refers to Ibn Najim who opined that even if a person were to abandon
a 'low' profession he would not be able to remove the 'stains' that, allegedly,
inevitably form on his character from such an occupation and hence he cannot be
considered as the kafa'a of a person
from a family that follows a 'respectable' profession. Closer to our times,
Nu'mani notes, Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1921), the founder of the Barelwi school,
is said to have declared that weavers, cobblers and barbers, even if learned in
religion, could not be considered the kafa'a
of those following 'respectable' professions.[16] Hence, Nu'mani remarks,
the notion that one should not marry outside one's occupational group, which in
India is generally the caste group, is widely accepted by many Indian Hanafi
'ulama.
In discussing the Hanafi position on kafa'a
being determined, among other factors, by one's profession, Nu'mani writes that
Hanafi 'ulama have resorted to two sources to legitimize their argument.
Firstly, popular custom or 'urf. By regarding caste-based
occupation as a legitimate 'urf they have sought to incorporate it into the
corpus of fiqh. This, however, says
Nu'mani, is a gross violation of Islam and 'a conscious or unconscious
imitation of the Indian Brahminical
social system'.[17] The other source that the fuqaha have invoked to support their claim of kafa'a being dependent on occupation is a single hadith attributed to the Prophet.
According to this narration, the Prophet is said to have declared that weavers
and barbers are not to be considered as the kafa'a
of others. This means, therefore, that weavers and barbers cannot marry people
who belong to families that follow other professions. Nu'mani remarks that this
hadith is 'very weak' (intihai za'if) and adds that numerous
scholars of Hadith have argued that it is a later fabrication wrongly
attributed to the Prophet. How could the Prophet, who is considered as a source
of mercy for all, consider any members of his community as despicable simply
because they were weavers or barbers, Num'ani asks.[18] Indirectly critiquing
these anti-egalitarian reports, Nu'mani here refers to several prophets before Muhammad as well as numerous companions of
Muhammad who engaged in occupations that some later fuqaha wrongly described as 'low'. Thus, he notes that the prophet
David was an artisan and that numerous companions of Muhammad were weavers and
carpenters.[19]
Nu'mani writes that all legitimate (halal,
jai'z) occupations are noble and praise-worthy in God's eyes, and hence to
claim that weaving, barbering and other such trades are 'despicable' as some fuqaha have done, is completely against
basic Islamic teachings. Therefore, he argues, from a strictly Qur'anic perspective,
a person pursuing any legitimate profession may be considered the kafa'a of any other similar person for
purposes of marriage. In this regard he quotes Mufti Kifayatullah, a leading
Indian Deobandi scholar, whom he singles out as one of the few Indian 'ulama to
have taken a correct position on kafa'a,
as having declared in a fatwa that 'To consider someone inferior simply because
he follows a legitimate profession is opposed to the teachings of Islam'.[20]
In approvingly quoting Mufti Kifayatullah here Nu'mani does not deny that
several other leading Deobandi scholars, such as Ashraf Ali Thanwi and Mufti
Muhammad Shafi, had adopted a divergent stance by supporting the dominant
Hanafi position on kafa'a as being determined,
among other factors, by occupation. He also admits that Thanwi had gone so far
as to declare weavers and oil-pressers as 'low' castes. Yet, he claims, in
contrast to their Barelwi opponents, the Deobandi 'ulama have never hesitated
to correct each other's views. [21] Indeed, he does this himself explicitly in
critiquing the views of his fellow Deobandis, renowned 'ulama such as Thanwi
and Shafi, on the matter of kafa'a.
Family, tribe or ethnic group (nasb)
have also been considered by several classical fuqaha as well as Indian 'ulama as an essential basis for deciding kafa'a. Yet, Nu'mani writes, not one of
the several traditions attributed to the Prophet that have been adduced for
this purpose have been proved to be fully genuine (sahih). They are all said to be 'very weak' and even 'fabricated' (mauzu). Nu'mani examines five traditions
attributed to the Prophet that are generally used to argue the case for nasb to be included in kafa'a. All of them, he contends, are fabricated,
have weak chains of narration (isnad)
or else do not have any direct bearing on the question of nasb in marriage. To illustrate his argument, he focuses on one
particular tradition, according to which the Prophet is said to have laid down
that all members of his Qur'aish clan are of the same kafa'a; that all Arabs belong to the same kafa'a; that members of one tribe are the kafa'a of each other; and that all people are of the same kafa'a except for weavers and
barbers.[22] Like other similar reports, this one, too, Nu'mani claims, is not
to be regarded as absolutely authentic for it has a weak narrative chain.
Indeed, several Islamic scholars have insisted that it is 'completely
fabricated'.[23] This report is said also to completely contradict the
teachings of the Qur'an, the genuine prophetic traditions and the practice of
the companions of the Prophet, and, for that additional reason, is not to be
regarded as authentic. The Qur'an repeatedly stresses that all Muslims are
equal, and one such Qur'anic verse, Nu'mani writes, is said to have been
specifically revealed to the Prophet to refute the belief that people should
marry only within their own tribe.[24] Likewise, numerous genuine Prophetic
traditions are said to directly oppose the belief in nasb being essential to kafa'a.
Thus, several companions of the Prophet are said to have married outside their
tribe with the Prophet's consent. The Prophet advised one of his followers, an
Ansar from
Despite the clear evidence in the Qur'an and the Hadith that nasb is not to be included in kafa'a, Nu'mani notes that several fuqaha have expressed contrary opinions.
However, he writes that there is no complete consensus among the fuqaha on the matter. Thus, Imam Malik
as well as some Hanafi 'ulama did not include nasb in establishing kafa'a,
while Imam Abu
Hanifa and Imam Shafi' did so.[25] There are conflicting views on Imam Ahmad
ibn Hanbal's opinion. According to one report he ignored nasb in establishing kafa'a,
while according to another report he regarded all Arabs as being equal for
marriage purposes, and all non-Arabs ('ajamis)
as equal, thus forbidding marriage between Arabs and non-Arabs. Nu'mani argues
that those fuqaha who included nasb in kafa'a probably did so because of the particular social conditions
prevailing at their time. However, he adds, because of the 'unnecessary
importance' which the contemporary Indian 'ulama give to nasb, 'numerous social problems have been created' and non-Muslims
are 'getting a wrong message' about Islam. Hence, he appeals for 'serious
thinking' on the matter of nasb in establishing kafa'a. A mark of the remarkable flexibility of Nu'mani's approach
to fiqh is his approval of the few
Indian Hanafi 'ulama who have adopted the position of Imam Malik on the
question of nasb in kafa'a in their fatwas instead of blindly following the dominant Hanafi
position.[26]
Further on the question of linking nasb
to kafa'a, Nu'mani deals with the
distinction that many Hanafi scholars have established between old Muslims (jadid al-islam musalman) and new Muslims
(jadid al-islam musalman), and
arguing that the two may not intermarry because they are not the kafa'a of each other. According to these
scholars, a man who converts to
Islam cannot marry a woman who was born to a Muslim father. The son of a
convert to Islam cannot marry a woman whose paternal grandfather and father
were Muslims, but the grandson of a convert can marry a woman from an 'old'
Muslim family. Accordingly, a convert to Islam can only marry a fellow convert.
This holds true only for non-Arabs, there being no distinction between 'old'
and 'new' Muslims for Arabs.[27]
Nu'mani sees this restrictive provision as making life for converts to Islam
even more difficult and, therefore, making conversion to Islam a difficult choice
for non-Muslims. By making this distinction between 'old' and 'new' Muslims, he
says, 'rather than welcoming our new guests we are insulting them'.[28] Accordingly,
he fervently appeals to his fellow 'ulama
to relax or abandon this rule, which in any case he sees as having no sanction
in Islam. He reminds them that because they insisted on this un-Islamic provision,
a large group of Hindus of the Tyagi caste in northern India who were ready to
convert to Islam finally decided not to because the Muslim Tyagis refused to
intermarry with them on the grounds that 'old' Muslims could not establish
marital relations with converts. Likewise, Nu'mani writes, it was because of
the discriminatory and anti-Qur'anic rules that the 'ulama have devised on kafa'a that Dr.Ambedkar, the leader of
the 'low' caste Dalits, declined to convert to Islam, choosing Buddhism instead.[29]
Nu'mani admits that some of his fellow Deobandis have argued that 'old' and
'new' Muslims are not of the same kafa'a
and so cannot intermarry. In addition, he notes that they have also argued that
Muslims from different castes cannot marry on the grounds of not belonging to
the same nasb. Yet, Nu'mani refuses
to be bound by their views. In order to press his claim that nasb should not be regarded as an
essential factor in determining kafa'a
he points to alternate opinions within the broader Deobandi tradition. Thus, he
refers to fatwas by such scholars
Mufi Kifayatullah and Sayyed Sulaiman Nadwi asserting that nasb was not to be considered as essential component of kafa'a,[30] and that a convert could
indeed marry into a family of 'old' Muslims on the grounds that all Muslims are
equal.[31] Nu'mani notes the existence of what he calls 'very weak' prophetic
traditions stressing nasb in kafa'a, but says that in their light 'at
the most' what can be said is that it might be better to marry within one's
ethnic group or caste (biraderi) than
outside. However, he says, this clearly does not mean that marriage must only
take place within one's caste but only that marrying outside one's caste is not
disallowed by the shari'ah.[32] If
marriage outside one's caste were thus to be recognized, Nu'mani suggests that
it would promote Muslim unity, help converts to Islam find spouses within the
Muslim community, and counter the perception among non-Muslims' of the
existence of caste discrimination among Muslims.[33]
After reviewing the writings of the classical fuqaha and some influential twentieth century Indian Hanafi scholars
on kafa'a being determined by wealth,
occupation and ethnicity, Nu'mani writes that, notwithstanding their
differences, all the schools of Sunni jurisprudence are agreed that piety
should be a determining factor in deciding kafa'a
in marriage. 'It should not be', he writes, 'that a pious girl who regularly
says her prayers and keeps her fasts should be married to a criminal' simply because
he belongs to the same ethnic or occupational group. He approvingly refers to
some classical fuqaha who opined that
the piety was to be the only determining factor in selecting a marriage
partner. In order to further support his contention that piety alone should be
the criterion for kafa'a he quotes a
Prophetic tradition to the effect that a marriage proposal from a man of high
morals should be accepted, otherwise it would lead to strife.[34] In another hadith the Prophet is said to have
warned against marrying a woman simply because of her beauty or wealth. Her
good looks might lead her to evil ways, while her wealth might make her rebellious
and proud. On the other hand, a pious black slave girl, Muhammad declared, made
a much better marriage partner. Thus, Nu'mani concludes, the Qur'an and the
genuine prophetic traditions clearly suggest that it is piety alone that should
be basis of kafa'a, with other
factors 'having no real importance'.[35]
In effect, then, by subjecting the existing corpus of fiqh and the writings of the classical and later Indian 'ulama to a
critical reading, Nu'mani argues for the need to go back to the Qur'an and the
genuine Prophetic traditions to develop a new fiqhi perspective on kafa'a and
caste. By appealing to the radically egalitarian social ethics contained in the
Qur'an and the genuine Prophetic traditions, by subjecting some traditions that
seem to promote social inequality to a critical contextual reading, by dismissing
anti-egalitarian traditions as inauthentic, and by pointing out the divergent
views of the fuqaha and 'ulama of
different schools of jurisprudence and within each school on the matter of kafa'a, Nu'mani argues that piety alone
should be considered as the essential basis of kafa'a. In this way, he critiques both the notion of caste as well
as the arguments of the fuqaha who
have sought to incorporate caste as a major factor in deciding kafa'a, thereby granting caste a certain
religious legitimacy.
Conclusion
As this paper has sought to show, although the Qur'an and the genuine Prophetic
traditions suggest a radically egalitarian social vision, actual Muslim social
practice, including in India, points to the existence of sharp social
hierarchies that numerous Muslim scholars have sought to provide appropriate 'Islamic'
sanction through elaborate rules of fiqh
associated with the notion of kafa'a.
This was further boosted by distorted interpretations of the Qur'an and the
invention of reports attributed to the Prophet that sought to legitimize social
inequality based on ethnicity and occupation. In the Indian context, numerous
leading 'ulama, almost all from the 'high' castes, have used these arguments to
sanction caste and caste-based distinctions, particularly in matters of
marriage. Yet, as Nu'mani's case shows, today at least some Indian 'ulama are
willing to critically examine the corpus of medieval fiqh and seek inspiration and guidance directly from the Qur'an and
the genuine Prophetic traditions instead, in order to recover the original
Islamic vision that is robustly opposed to social hierarchy determined by
birth, the very basis of the caste system.
------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] Mohammad Habib & Afsar 'Umar Salim
Khan, The Political Theory of the Delhi
Sultanate (Including a translation of Ziauddin Barani's Fatawa-i Jahandari Circa
1358-
[2] Ibid., p.49.
[3] Ibid., p.49.
[4] Ibid., p.95.
[5] Ibid., pp.97-8.
[6] Ibid., pp.97-8.
[7] H.N.Ansari, 'Hindustani Musalmano Ki Samaji Darja Bandi', in Ashfaq Husain Ansari, Pasmanda Musalmano Ke Masa'il',
Centre of Backward Muslims,
p.25)
[8] 'Abdul Hamid Nu'mani, Masla-i Kufw
Aur Isha'at-i- Islam, New Delhi: Qazi Publications, 2002, p.10.
[9] Ibid., p.10.
[10] Ibid., p.4.
[11] Ibid., pp.6-8.
[12] Ibid., p.27.
[13] Ibid., p.27.
[14] Ibid., p.17.
[15] Ibid., p.13.
[16] Ibid., p.17.
[17] Ibid., p.16.
[18] Ibid., p.15.
[19] Ibid., p.16.
[20] Ibid., p.16.
[21] Ibid., p.19.
[22] Ibid., p.25.
[23] Ibid., p.29.
[24] Ibid., p.30.
[25] Ibid., p.22.
[26] These 'ulama include Mufti Kifayatullah, Sayyed Sulaiman Nadwi and Mufti
Yasin, author of the Fatawa-i Ahya-
ul-'Ulum (Ibid., p.23).
[27] Ibid., p.33.
[28] Ibid., p.36.
[29] Ibid., p.37.
[30] Ibid., p.23.
[31] Ibid., p.39.
[32] Ibid., p.24.
[33] Ibid., p.25.
[34] Ibid., p.20.
[35] Ibid., p.21.
